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Abstract
There is widespread evidence that some ﬁrms use false advertising to overstate the value
of their products. We consider a model in which a policymaker is able to punish such false
claims. We characterize an equilibrium where false advertising actively inﬂuences rational
buyers, and analyze the eﬀects of policy under diﬀerent welfare objectives. We establish
precise conditions where policy optimally permits a positive level of false advertising, and
show how these conditions vary intuitively with demand and market parameters. We also
consider the implications for product investment and industry self-regulation, and connect
our results to the literature on demand curvature.
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1 Introduction
Buyers are often reliant on ﬁrms to obtain information about product characteristics. To exploit
this, some ﬁrms deliberately engage in what we call false advertising - the use of incorrect
or exaggerated product claims. They do this in a range of diﬀerent contexts and despite
potential legal penalties1. Recent policy cases include Dannon which paid $21m to 39 US states
after it misled consumers about the health beneﬁts of its Activia yogurt products, Skechers
which paid $40m after falsely stating that its toning shoes helped with weight loss, and the
manufacturer of Nurofen which was ﬁned 1.7m Australian dollars after making false claims
about the eﬀectiveness of its painkillers. Similarly, in some related examples, car manufacturers
such as Volkswagen and Mitsubishi are facing multi-billion dollar penalties after cheating tests
in order to make false claims about their emission levels or fuel eﬃciency2. Additional evidence
also comes from academic research which carefully documents the existence of false advertising
and its ability to increase demand3.
However, despite the existence of false advertising, the theoretical literature has largely
restricted attention to truthful advertising. In this paper, we develop an equilibrium model of
false advertising where false advertising can actively inﬂuence rational buyers. Tougher legal
penalties reduce the frequency of false adverts, but also increase their credibility. As a result of
the latter eﬀect, we show when and how stronger penalties can reduce buyer and social welfare.
In particular, by using some results on demand curvature, the paper derives precise conditions
on demand and market parameters such that a policymaker optimally uses a low penalty to
permit a positive level of false advertising. We then consider several wider issues including
investment incentives, and the potential optimality of industry self-regulation.
In more detail, Section 2 introduces our main model where a monopolist is privately in-
formed about its product quality. While we later extend the results in a number of ways, we
initially focus on the case where quality is either `high' or `low' and where the two types have
symmetric marginal costs. The policymaker ﬁrst commits to a penalty for false advertising.
Then having learned its type, the ﬁrm chooses a price and makes a (possibly false) claim about
1In the US, most federal-level regulation is conducted by the FTC which punishes oﬀenses with various public
measures, including possible monetary penalties. In Europe, most countries employ varying levels of industry
self-regulation alongside statutory regulations. For instance, in the UK, most regulation is conducted by the
industry-led Advertising Standards Authority. It is endorsed by various governmental bodies, which have the
power to issue ﬁnes.
2For further details, see http://www.ftc.gov/news-events/press-releases/2010/12/dannon-agrees-drop-
exaggerated-health-claims-activia-yogurt, http://www.ftc.gov/news-events/press-releases/2012/05/skechers-
will-pay-40-million-settle-ftc-charges-it-deceived, http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/business-36167011,
http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/business-36651853, and http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/business-36137719. Ac-
cessed 07/18/16.
3E.g. Zinman and Zitzewitz (2016), Rao and Wang (2015), and Cawley et al (2013). See also Mayzlin et al
(2014) for false advertising in the form of fake user reviews.
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its quality. Buyers subsequently update their beliefs and make their purchase decisions, before
the policymaker instigates any penalties. We believe this set-up closely approximates many
important markets where buyers are unable to verify claims, or can only do so after a long
time, and where policy plays a key role in regulating advertising.
Section 3 characterizes an equilibrium where the high type advertises truthfully and where
the low type may engage in false advertising. This equilibrium does not resemble a standard
price signaling equilibrium due to the assumption of symmetric costs. Instead, it smoothly
uniﬁes several otherwise separate cases depending on the level of penalty. Firstly when the
policymaker's penalty is large, there is no false advertising. Here, as in the standard disclosure
literature, quality claims are fully veriﬁable and product quality is perfectly revealed within a
full separating equilibrium. Secondly when the penalty is small, the low type always conducts
false advertising within a full pooling equilibrium. In this case, advertising is cheap talk and so
buyers simply maintain their prior beliefs even after observing a high claim. Finally, when the
penalty is moderate, our equilibrium involves a novel form of partially veriﬁable advertising.
Here, the low type engages in false advertising probabilistically by mixing between i) pooling
with the high type, with a false advert and a relatively high price, and ii) advertising truthfully
with a relatively low price. Therefore when buyers observe a high claim, they positively update
their belief that quality is high. Hence, in contrast to full separation, false advertising does
arise in equilibrium but unlike in full pooling, advertised claims do still provide buyers with
some new information about the ﬁrm's quality.
Section 4 then analyzes how marginal changes in the level of penalty aﬀect a variety of
welfare measures. We ﬁrst consider buyer surplus. Here, a reduction in the penalty increases
the probability of false advertising and generates two opposing eﬀects. The ﬁrst `persuasion'
eﬀect harms buyers by prompting them to buy too many units of a product at an inﬂated price.
The second eﬀect derives from the impact of false advertising on damaging the credibility of
claims. Understanding the impact on credibility goes back to at least Nelson (1974) and is well-
documented empirically (e.g. Darke and Richie 2007). However, instead of viewing this impact
as detrimental, we document a beneﬁcial `price' eﬀect whereby false advertising counteracts
monopoly power by lowering buyers' quality expectations and prompting lower prices.
To compare these two eﬀects under a relatively general form of demand, we then utilize
some recent results on demand curvature and cost pass-through (Weyl and Fabinger 2013).
Such results are being used in an increasing number of applications, such as price discrimination
(e.g. Chen and Schwartz 2015, Cowan 2012). However, rather than focusing on cost changes, we
analyze the impact of changes in quality on price, which we term as `quality pass-through'. In
many cases, we show how the persuasion eﬀect dominates such that buyer surplus is maximized
by eliminating false advertising. However, we also formalize a set of parameter conditions where
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the price eﬀect dominates. Here, the optimal penalty is softer so as to induce a positive level
of false advertising. Such parameter cases include those where product quality levels are high
or where the probability of high quality is large.
Next, we turn to the eﬀect on proﬁts. Unsurprisingly the low (high) type always prefers
smaller (larger) penalties. Interestingly however, ex ante, the monopolist weakly prefers strong
penalties to eradicate false advertising so that it can price more eﬀectively under high quality.
Hence, if the monopolist could commit (perhaps via some third-party), its choice of penalty
would coincide with that preferred by buyers in many circumstances. This oﬀers potential
support for Europe's use of self-regulation. However, for other circumstances, in contrast to
the view that self-regulation may be too soft, the monopolist's preferred penalty is too strong
relative to buyers' preferences.
Lastly, we consider total welfare. Here, an increase in the probability of false advertising
leads to two diﬀerent eﬀects. On the one hand, false advertising lowers the credibility of any
high claim and so prompts any type with such a claim to further reduce its output below the
socially desirable level. However, on the other hand, false advertising also allows the low type
to expand its output. We then characterize a set of parameter conditions where this latter
output expansion is beneﬁcial and dominates the former eﬀect, such that a positive level of
false advertising is welfare optimal.
Section 5 extends the main model to consider the additional eﬀects of false advertising when
product quality is endogenous. This is important to consider because false advertising can
reduce product quality investment by limiting the available returns from high quality products.
However, while we conﬁrm that such an `investment' eﬀect prompts the policymaker to select
a weakly higher penalty, we further show how a positive level of false advertising can remain
optimal for buyer and social welfare. In addition, once quality is endogenous, we also show how
a penalty increase can raise the probability of false advertising.
Finally, Section 6 considers some robustness issues. First, we allow for an arbitrary number
of quality types. Qualitatively the analysis remains the same as for the two-type case except
now the policymaker must also decide which types can engage in false advertising. We show
how false advertising can remain optimal for types with `moderate' quality. Second, we let the
ﬁrm types vary in marginal costs. Here, the resulting equilibrium and policy results remain
qualitatively robust after making stronger requirements on buyer beliefs. Third, we examine
a competitive context where an incumbent faces an entrant with private product quality. We
demonstrate an equilibrium with false advertising that is qualitatively similar to monopoly, and
provide related policy results for buyer surplus, proﬁts, and total welfare.
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Related Literature: The advertising literature typically focuses on truthful advertising (e.g.
Anderson and Renault 2006, Johnson and Myatt 20064). In earlier work, Nelson (1974) oﬀered a
seminal discussion of false advertising and how regulation may increase its credibility. However,
since then, false advertising and its regulation has only been considered by some recent papers.
Some papers assume that buyers are naive and so believe all claims (e.g. Glaeser and
Ujhelyi 2010, Hattori and Higashida 2012). Here, false advertising raises ﬁrms' proﬁts, low-
ers consumer surplus, and can increase total welfare by oﬀsetting the output distortion from
imperfect competition. Other papers seek to endogenize advertising credibility with rational
buyers. One set of papers, including some within marketing, introduce heterogeneous tastes
so that claims can gain credibility by forfeiting revenues from some buyers (e.g. Chakraborty
and Harbaugh 2014). However, these papers place little emphasis on policy. Another set of
papers examine legal penalties in ways more related to our paper. Corts (2013, 2014a, 2014b)
examines an information acquisition setting where a monopolist knows its type but ﬁnds it
costly to learn its precise product quality. Total welfare is assumed to be increasing in the
ﬁneness of consumer information. For low learning costs, total welfare is maximized with high
penalties that induce the ﬁrm to learn its quality and eradicate false advertising. However when
learning costs are higher, such that the ﬁrm chooses not to know its quality, high penalties can
damage total welfare by discouraging the use of advertising. Instead, lower penalties can raise
welfare by inducing the ﬁrm to use speculative quality claims to signal its type even when such
claims are false with positive probability. Under a diﬀerent mechanism, Piccolo et al (2015)
demonstrate that false advertising can maximize buyer surplus in a duopoly where the ﬁrms
have diﬀerent product qualities. They show that it is always optimal to use zero `laissez-faire'
penalties to induce full pooling rather than full separation. Intuitively, this creates a downward
competitive pressure on prices by making the ﬁrms appear undiﬀerentiated. However, after
studying a monopoly version of the model, the authors suggest that this result can only arise
in a competitive context.5
Our research diﬀers from this previous literature in a number of important respects. Firstly,
we analyze a richer class of semi-pooling equilibria. Unlike the full pooling and separating
equilibria in past models, these equilibria allow for false claims to arise in equilibrium, and to
inﬂate buyers' beliefs beyond their priors. Secondly, by using a more general form of demand,
we highlight a novel role for demand curvature not present in other papers. This also enables
us to provide precise conditions for when false advertising is beneﬁcial, and to show how the
4See also the comprehensive literature reviews by Bagwell (2007) and Renault (2015).
5In more distant work, Daughety and Reinganum (1997) study how punitive damages for false safety claims
can help support separating equilibria when ﬁrms face liability losses for product defects, Barigozzi et al (2009)
examine false comparative advertising, and Drugov and Troya-Martinez (2015) analyze false advice where ﬁrms
can also choose the vagueness of their claims.
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optimal penalty varies intuitively with demand and market parameters. Thirdly, we show that
competition is not necessary for false advertising to maximize buyer surplus. Moreover rather
than focusing on just one objective, we provide a uniﬁed set of results for buyer surplus, total
welfare and ﬁrm proﬁts.
Our paper is related to a number of broader areas. First, it adds to the growing literature
on the economics of consumer protection policy which considers other topics, such as high-
pressure sales tactics (Armstrong and Zhou 2016) and refund rights (Inderst and Ottaviani
2013). Second, our model relates to a number of communication papers that study equilibrium
lying and persuasion under full rationality (e.g. Kartik 2009, and Kamenica and Gentzkow
2011). In contrast, we study policy-related lying costs within a speciﬁc advertising context,
where a third-party inﬂuences not only the amount of information that is communicated to
buyers but also indirectly the price that they pay. Third, our paper is related to the literatures
on price signaling and quality disclosure (see Bagwell 2007 and Dranove and Jin 2010 for
respective reviews). These literatures also note that total welfare can be maximized by some
form of pooling due to either i) the output distortions from price signaling under separation,
or ii) positive costs of disclosure. However, our results provide clear conditions to characterize
when (partial) pooling can be buyer- or welfare-optimal even when truthful disclosure is costless,
and when full separation does not require the ﬁrm to distort its output away from the full
information level.
2 Model
A monopolist sells one product to a unit mass of potential buyers. The monopolist is privately
informed about its product quality q. Speciﬁcally, the product is of low quality L with prob-
ability x ∈ (0, 1), and of high quality H with probability 1 − x, where −∞ < L < H < ∞.
Average ex ante quality is then deﬁned as q¯ = xL+ (1−x)H. For our main analysis we assume
that marginal costs are independent of quality and normalized to zero. Each buyer has a unit
demand and values a given product of quality q at q + ε, where ε is a buyer's privately known
match with the product. This match is drawn independently across buyers using a distribution
function G(ε) with support [a, b] where −∞ ≤ a < b ≤ ∞. The associated density g(ε) is
strictly positive, continuously diﬀerentiable, and has an increasing hazard rate.
The monopolist sends a publicly observable advertisement or `report' r ∈ {L,H} at no cost,
where a report r = z is equivalent to a claim Product quality is z. The binary report space is
without loss because there are only two ﬁrm types and reports are costless. A policymaker is
able to verify any advertised claim and impose a penalty φ if it is false, where false advertising
is deﬁned as the use of a high quality report r = H, by a ﬁrm with low quality q = L. The
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penalty φ can be interpreted as an expected penalty if claims are only veriﬁed probabilistically.
The policymaker can costlessly choose any level of penalty, φ ≥ 0, in order to maximize one
of three possible objectives: buyer surplus, total proﬁt, or total welfare. Any penalties that
involve a ﬁne go to the policymaker.6
The timing of the game is as follows. At stage 1 the policymaker publicly commits to a
penalty φ for false advertising. At stage 2 the monopolist privately learns its quality. It then
announces a price p and issues a report r ∈ {L,H}. At stage 3 buyers decide whether to buy
the product, taking into account φ as well as the ﬁrm's price and report. Finally at stage 4
the policymaker veriﬁes the advertised claim and administers the penalty, φ, if it is false. The
solution concept is Perfect Bayesian Equilibrium (PBE). All omitted proofs are included in the
appendix unless stated otherwise.
3 Equilibrium Analysis
3.1 Benchmark with Known Quality
As a ﬁrst step, consider a benchmark case in which the ﬁrm is known to have quality q. Quality
claims are then redundant because it is weakly optimal for the ﬁrm to use truthful advertising.
An individual buyer purchases the product if and only if ε ≥ p − q such that demand equals
D(p− q) = 1−G(p− q). The ﬁrm then chooses its price to maximize p [1−G (p− q)], and so:
Lemma 1. Suppose the ﬁrm is known to have quality q, and deﬁne q˜ = −b and q˜ = −a+1/g(a).The ﬁrm's optimal price, p∗(q), is increasing in q and satisﬁes:
p∗(q) =

0 if q ≤ q˜
1−G(p∗(q)−q)
g(p∗(q)−q) if q ∈
(
q˜, q˜
)
a+ q if q ≥ q˜
(1)
When q ≤ q˜, quality is so low that the ﬁrm would make zero sales even if it priced atmarginal cost. The market is inactive, and we normalize the ﬁrm's price to zero without loss.
When instead q ∈ (q˜, q˜), the ﬁrm optimally sells to some but not all buyers such that p∗ (q)satisﬁes the usual monopoly ﬁrst order condition. Finally if q ≥ q˜, quality is so high that
the ﬁrm optimally sells to all potential customers by pricing at the willingness-to-pay of the
marginal buyer, a+q, such that the market is `covered'. However, for some distributions, q˜ =∞
and so this ﬁnal case is redundant. Henceforth to avoid some uninteresting cases, let q¯ > q˜ (orq¯ + b > 0) such that a product of average quality always has some positive value.
6More broadly, one could also interpret φ to include any direct costs of making a false claim. For instance,
as in the case of Volkswagen, these could include the costs of falsifying emissions tests.
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Our later analysis will consider how the optimal price varies with quality, and we will
sometimes refer to dp∗(q)/dq as `quality pass-through'. Firstly for q ∈ (q˜, q˜), after diﬀerentiatingthe ﬁrst order condition:
dp∗(q)
dq
=
1− σ(p∗(q)− q)
2− σ(p∗(q)− q)) , (2)
where σ(ψ) = −[1−G(ψ)]g′(ψ)/g(ψ)2 is the curvature of demand (see Aguirre et al 2010, and
Weyl and Fabinger 2013). It then follows that dp∗(q)/dq ∈ [0, 1) because our assumption of
an increasing hazard rate implies that D(p − q) is logconcave in price, such that σ(ψ) ≤ 1.
Intuitively, an increase in quality q produces a parallel outward shift in the inverse demand
curve, and the ﬁrm optimally responds by both charging a higher price and by selling to
strictly more buyers.7 Secondly, where appropriate, when q ≥ q˜ quality pass-through is one.
The equilibrium proﬁt earned by a ﬁrm of known quality q can be written as
pi∗(q) = p∗(q) [1−G (p∗(q)− q)] . (3)
It is straightforward to show that pi∗ (q) is increasing and convex in q given that g(ε) has an
increasing hazard rate. Finally, buyer surplus can be expressed as
v∗(q) =
ˆ b+q
p∗(q)
[1−G (z − q)] dz. (4)
Observe that v∗ (q) = 0 when q ≤ q˜ because no buyer purchases the product, but that buyersurplus is positive and weakly increasing in q > q˜. We further discuss the shape of v∗(q) inSection 4.1 below.
3.2 Privately-Known Quality
Henceforth we assume that the ﬁrm is privately informed about its quality. As is typical in
signaling games, there exists a large number of PBE because buyers can attribute any oﬀ-path
claim or price to the low type. We therefore proceed as follows. Firstly we only consider PBE in
which the high type makes a truthful claim with probability one. Although there do exist PBE
in which the high type reports r = L, these equilibria require buyers to perversely believe that
a ﬁrm with a higher claim has lower quality; such beliefs do not satisfy common reﬁnements
such as D1. Secondly then, if a ﬁrm reports r = L it is reasonable for buyers to believe that
quality is low with probability one. Therefore if the low type reports r = L it should charge its
full information price p∗(L), and hence earn pi∗(L). If instead the low type reports r = H, it
7Weyl and Fabinger (2013) note that the optimal price change from any outward unit shift in inverse demand
(such as an increase in quality within our model) equals one minus cost pass-through.
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must charge the same price as the high type, otherwise buyers would correctly infer its type and
it would earn (weakly) less than pi∗(L). Thirdly, we need to determine the price charged by the
ﬁrm when it reports r = H. Many such prices can form a PBE even after applying standard
reﬁnements such as D1, due to the symmetry in marginal costs.8 Therefore to make further
progress in selecting amongst these prices, we restrict attention to buyer beliefs which depend
only on the ﬁrm's claim and not its price. This implies that the ﬁrm should charge p∗ (qeH) when
it makes a high report, where qeH ≡ E (q|r = H) denotes buyer beliefs after observing a high
report. One justiﬁcation for this restriction is as follows. Notice that conditional on sending
a high report, the payoﬀ functions of the two types diﬀer only by the penalty φ. Therefore
buyers might reasonably expect the two types to price in the same way after reporting r = H,
and therefore avoid making any price-based inferences.9 We can then state:
Proposition 1. Suppose a high type always reports truthfully, and buyer beliefs depend only on
the ﬁrm's claim. There exists a unique PBE10, in which:
i) A high type claims r = H and charges p∗(qeH).
ii) A low type randomizes. With probability y∗ it claims r = H and charges p∗(qeH). With
probability 1− y∗ it claims r = L and charges p∗(L).
- When φ ≤ φ1 ≡ pi∗(q¯)− pi∗(L), y∗ = 1
- When φ ≥ φ0 ≡ pi∗(H)− pi∗(L), y∗ = 0
- When φ ∈ (φ1, φ0), y∗ ∈ (0, 1) and uniquely solves
pi∗(qeH)− φ = pi∗(L), (5)
where qeH =
xy∗L+ (1− x)H
1− x+ xy∗ . (6)
iii) Buyer beliefs are Pr (q = H|r = L) = 0 and Pr (q = H|r = H) = 1−x
1−x+xy∗ .
8When φ ≥ pi∗(H) − pi∗(L), D1 selects a fully separating equilibrium in which the low type plays {r =
L, p = p∗(L)}, whilst the high type plays {r = H, p∗(H)}. However when φ < pi∗(H)− pi∗(L) many equilibrium
outcomes are consistent with D1. Among others, this includes a continuum of semi-pooling equilibria, where
for diﬀerent levels of some price psp the high type plays {r = H, p = psp}, and the low type randomizes between
{r = L, p = p∗(L)} and {r = H, p = psp}.
9Another justiﬁcation is as follows. First, consider a diﬀerent game G in which low and high types only signal
via their price, and have payoﬀ functions Π(p, qe)− φ and Π(p, qe) respectively where qe is buyers' belief about
quality. This game has many PBE and D1 has no bite. However Mailath et al 's (1993) Undefeated reﬁnement
selects a unique pooling equilibrium with price arg max Π(p, qe), and is consistent with price-independent buyer
beliefs. Now return to our game. Suppose buyers expect the low type to report r = H with probability y ∈ (0, 1],
and interpret any oﬀ-path price as a possible signal about the ﬁrm's type but not about y. Then conditional on
reporting r = H, the ﬁrm can be thought of as playing game G when choosing its price, and thus both types
should pool on p∗(qeH), with buyers' beliefs being independent of price.
10In particular, the equilibrium is unique up to oﬀ-path beliefs: when φ < φ1 the claim r = L is oﬀ-path, and
a range of beliefs Pr (q = L|r = L) lead to the same equilibrium play.
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The exact nature of the equilibrium in Proposition 1 depends intuitively on whether the
penalty for false advertising is `low', `medium', or `high'. Firstly, if φ ≥ φ0 ≡ pi∗(H) − pi∗(L)
the equilibrium has full separation, with both types reporting truthfully because the penalty
is suﬃciently high that truth-telling is a dominant strategy for the low type. Advertising
is perfectly informative and claims are fully believed by buyers. Consequently, each type q ∈
{L,H} sets its full information price p∗(q), and earns its full information proﬁt pi∗(q). Secondly,
if φ ≤ φ1 ≡ pi∗(q¯)−pi∗(L) the equilibrium has full pooling, with both types sending a high report
because the penalty is suﬃciently low that false advertising is a dominant strategy for the low
type. Upon seeing a high claim buyers then maintain their prior belief that the ﬁrm's average
quality is q¯. As such, both types set p∗(q¯) and earn proﬁts of pi∗(q¯) and pi∗(q¯)− φ respectively.
Finally and most interestingly, if φ ∈ (φ1, φ0) the equilibrium is semi-pooling. Here the low
type randomizes, making a false report with probability y∗ ∈ (0, 1) and a truthful report with
complementary probability 1 − y∗. Upon seeing a high report buyers therefore update their
belief about quality to
qeH ≡ E(q|r = H) =
xy∗L+ (1− x)H
1− x+ xy∗ ∈ (q¯, H).
Consequently the high type reports r = H and charges p∗(qeH), and the low type randomizes
between r = L and price p∗(L), and report r = H and price p∗(qeH). The probability with which
the low type lies, y∗, satisﬁes equation (5) and ensures that the payoﬀs from false advertising
and truth-telling are equal. If instead the low type lied with a probability above (below) y∗,
buyers' expected quality qeH would be too low (high) and hence the low type would have a strict
preference to report truthfully (falsely), yielding a contradiction. Hence randomization with
probability y∗ is an essential feature of this equilibrium.
Notice that false advertising exists in both the pooling and the semi-pooling equilibria.
However in a pooling equilibrium, buyers eﬀectively ignore high claims and simply maintain
their prior belief. On the other hand, semi-pooling equilibria have the more appealing feature
that high claims do provide buyers with some useful information, and thus induce them to
positively update their belief, with qeH > q¯.
4 The Eﬀects of Policy
First consider the eﬀects of policy on the level of false advertising, y∗. By using equations (5)
and (6) it follows that:
Lemma 2. The level of false advertising y∗, is continuous and weakly decreasing in the level
of penalty φ.
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This feature of the model is useful analytically in the subsquent sections, and ensures that
stronger policy smoothly increases the informativeness of advertising. When φ > φ0 or φ < φ1,
a low quality ﬁrm has a strict preference for truth-telling or lying respectively, and so small
changes in φ have no eﬀect. However when φ ∈ [φ1, φ0], the probability of false advertising y∗
satisﬁes the indiﬀerence condition (5) and is strictly decreasing in φ from 1 to 0. Intuitively, to
maintain indiﬀerence of the low type as φ increases, high reports must become more credible.
Since buyers are Bayesian, this is only possible if y∗ is strictly lower.
4.1 Buyer Surplus
We now consider the eﬀects of policy on a variety of welfare measures, starting with buyer
surplus. Using Proposition 1 we can write expected buyer surplus as
E(v) = x(1− y∗)
ˆ b
p∗(L)−L
(L+ ε− p∗(L)) dG(ε) + xy∗
ˆ b
p∗(qeH)−qeH
(L+ ε− p∗(qeH)) dG(ε)
+(1− x)
ˆ b
p∗(qeH)−qeH
(H + ε− p∗(qeH)) dG(ε). (7)
In words, with probability x(1 − y∗) the ﬁrm sends a low report and charges p∗(L). Buyers
correctly infer low quality, buy if ε ≥ p∗(L)−L, and receive L+ε−p∗(L). Then with probability
1−x+xy∗ the ﬁrm sends a high report and charges p∗(qeH). Buyers update their beliefs according
to equation (6), and buy if ε ≥ p∗(qeH) − qeH . With conditional probability xy∗/ (1− x+ xy∗),
the product is low quality, and buyers receive L + ε − p∗(qeH). With conditional probability
(1 − x)/ (1− x+ xy∗), the product is high quality, and buyers receive H + ε − p∗(qeH). After
collecting terms and using the deﬁnition of v∗(q) in equation (4), the above expression simpliﬁes
as follows, where E(v) is just a convex combination of v∗(L) and v∗(qeH).
E(v) = x(1− y∗)v∗(L) + (xy∗ + 1− x)v∗(qeH). (8)
We now exploit the smooth feature of our equilibrium to investigate the eﬀect of a marginal
increase in the penalty φ. In particular Lemma 3 will provide conditions under which an increase
in the penalty φ leads to a reduction in expected buyer surplus. To understand why this can
happen, recall that the level of false advertising y∗ is a decreasing function of φ, and note that
an increase in y∗ produces two eﬀects. On the one hand, buyers are more likely to receive a false
advert and so be persuaded to buy a low quality product at an inﬂated price p∗(qeH) > p
∗(L).
However on the other hand, the increase in lying damages the credibility of high quality claims,
and forces any type making such a claim to reduce its price. In more detail, using equation (8)
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one can write
∂E(v)
∂y∗
= x [v∗ (qeH)− (qeH − L)D (p∗(qeH)− qeH)− v∗(L)]︸ ︷︷ ︸
`Persuasion' eﬀect
− (1− x+ xy∗)D(p∗(qeH)− qeH)
∂p∗(qeH)
∂qeH
∂qeH
∂y∗︸ ︷︷ ︸
`Price' eﬀect
. (9)
The ﬁrst term is a `persuasion' eﬀect. Conditional on the ﬁrm having low quality (which
occurs with probability x), a marginal increase in lying replaces the surplus that the buyer
would have received if the ﬁrm had told the truth, v∗(L), with the surplus associated with
false advertising, v∗ (qeH)− (qeH − L)D (p∗(qeH)− qeH). To explain this latter surplus, note that
after observing a high report, buyers update their beliefs to qeH , and expect to receive a surplus
v∗ (qeH). However since quality is low, each of the D (p
∗(qeH)− qeH) units bought is worth qeH−L
less than anticipated. This harms buyers by prompting them to pay too much and to potentially
buy too many units of a low quality product. The second term in (9) is a `price' eﬀect. A
marginal increase in lying decreases the probability that a high claim is true, and so causes
rational buyers to revise their belief qeH downwards. This lowers the level of monopoly power and
induces any type with a high report to reduce its price by − (∂p∗(qeH)/∂qeH)×(∂qeH/∂y∗). Hence
conditional on the ﬁrm sending a high report (which occurs with probability 1−x+xy∗), buyer
surplus is strictly higher on each of the D(p∗(qeH)−qeH) inframarginal units bought. Importantly
for our later results, this eﬀect is more powerful when quality pass-through ∂p∗(qeH)/∂q
e
H is
larger.
In order to determine which of the persuasion and price eﬀects dominates, we impose the
following regularity condition on demand curvature:
Condition 1. Let zv(ψ) = −σ′(ψ) + [2− σ(ψ)]g(ψ)/[1−G(ψ)]. The demand function satisﬁes
either i) q˜ < ∞ and zv(ψ) > 0 for all ψ ∈ (a, b), or ii) q˜ = −∞, q˜ = ∞, zv(ψ) changes fromnegative to positive at exactly one value of ψ ∈ (a, b), and limψ→a σ(ψ) = −∞.
Condition 1 is satisﬁed by a wide class of demand functions, and ensures that v∗(q) is
s-shaped in quality. For convenience, we denote
qˆv = sup
{
q ∈ (q˜, q˜) : zv(p∗(q)− q) > 0
}
(10)
as the ﬁnite quality level at which v∗(q) changes from being strictly convex to concave. Con-
dition 1i is satisﬁed by a rich class of demands that exhibit constant curvature, which includes
linear and exponential demand (see Bulow and Pﬂeiderer 1983). Here qˆv = q˜ such that v
∗(q) is
strictly convex for all q ∈ (q˜, q˜), but independent of quality and equal to ´ ba [1−G (z)] dz when
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q > q˜. Alternatively, Condition 1ii is satisﬁed by many demands with increasing curvature -
including those derived from the Normal, Logistic, Type I Extreme Value and Weibull distri-
butions. For these demands qˆv solves zv (p
∗(q)− q) = 0, and v∗(q) is strictly convex for q < qˆv
but strictly concave for q > qˆv. Further details are provided in Section A of the Supplementary
Appendix.11 We can then state:
Lemma 3. Consider φ ∈ [φ1, φ0] and suppose that Condition 1 holds.
i) If L < qˆv expected buyer surplus is quasiconcave in φ. In particular there exists a threshold
q∗(L) ≥ qˆv (which is weakly decreasing in L and satisﬁes limL→qˆv q∗(L) = qˆv) such that expected
buyer surplus is strictly increasing in φ if qeH < q
∗(L), but strictly decreasing in φ if qeH > q
∗(L).
ii) If L > qˆv expected buyer surplus is weakly decreasing in φ.
Lemma 3 is interpreted as follows. First consider L < qˆv. When q
e
H < q
∗(L) buyers are
relatively pessimistic upon seeing a high report, quality pass-through is relatively weak, and
so the persuasion eﬀect dominates. When instead qeH > q
∗(L) buyers are relatively optimistic
upon seeing a high report, quality pass-through is relatively strong, and so the price eﬀect
dominates. Hence a stronger policy beneﬁts buyers in the former situation, but harms them in
the latter. Second consider L > qˆv. If demand satisﬁes Condition 1i, the price and persuasion
eﬀects cancel such that ∂E(v)/∂φ = 0. Intuitively the market is fully covered irrespective of
the ﬁrm's claim, and buyers pay either a+ L following a low claim, or a+ qeH following a high
claim. The average price paid is therefore a+ q¯ which is independent of φ. However if instead
demand satisﬁes Condition 1ii, the price eﬀect strictly dominates such that ∂E(v)/∂φ < 0.
We now consider the optimal level of penalty, φ∗. To ease exposition, we henceforth focus
on the (more interesting) case where L < qˆv. Recalling Lemma 3, we ﬁnd that:
Proposition 2. Fix L < qˆv and suppose that Condition 1 holds. The buyer-optimal penalty,
φ∗, is characterized as follows:
i) When H ≤ q∗(L), φ∗ ≥ φ0 such that y∗ = 0 .
ii) When q¯ < q∗(L) < H, φ∗ = pi∗(q∗(L))− pi∗ (L) such that y∗ = (H−q∗(L))(1−x)
(H−q∗(L))(1−x)+q∗(L)−q¯ ∈ (0, 1).
iii) When q∗(L) ≤ q¯, φ∗ ≤ φ1 such that y∗ = 1.
Proposition 2 provides a range of demand and parameter conditions where a buyer-oriented
policymaker refrains from eradicating false advertising. Recall from Lemma 3 that for L < qˆv, a
marginal decrease in false advertising increases buyer surplus if and only if buyers are relatively
pessimistic about high claims, with qeH < q
∗(L). Therefore when H ≤ q∗(L) buyer surplus is
globally decreasing in y∗ and the policymaker optimally eliminates false advertising. However
11This appendix may also prove useful for other wider literatures. For instance, a recent literature on the
welfare eﬀects of third-degree price discrimination uses a restriction related to Condition 1 which ensures that
buyer surplus is convex with respect to marginal cost (e.g. Chen and Schwartz 2015 and Cowan 2012).
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when q¯ < q∗(L) < H buyer surplus is quasiconcave and maximized at some y∗ ∈ (0, 1), such
that the optimal penalty tolerates some false advertising. Finally when q∗(L) ≤ q¯ buyer surplus
is globally increasing in y∗ and so the policymaker fully permits false advertising.
The fact that a positive level of false advertising can generate a higher buyer surplus than
under full information (where y∗ = 0) gives several policy implications. First, any instinctive per
se implementation of strong penalties or blanket prohibitions on false advertising may actually
limit buyer surplus. Second, the optimal use of advertising penalties is superior to an outright
ban on low quality products. Such a ban only generates a surplus E(v) = (1− x)v∗(H), which
is weakly less than the surplus under full information.
Finally, we further detail the conditions under which positive false advertising is optimal.
Corollary 1. Given Condition 1 and L < qˆv, the buyer-optimal level of false advertising is
increasing in L, H, and (1− x).
When product quality levels are higher, or when the probability of a high type is larger,
policy should allow a higher level of false advertising, y∗. Intuitively, when the monopolist's
product quality technology is relatively `healthy', the expected quality from a high claim, qeH ,
is relatively high such that the price eﬀect becomes relatively more powerful. On the contrary,
when the product quality technology is less `healthy', the persuasion eﬀect becomes especially
harmful.
4.2 Proﬁts
We now examine the eﬀect of policy on proﬁts. To begin, consider each individual ﬁrm type:
E (piL) =
pi∗(q¯)− φ if φ < φ1pi∗ (L) if φ ≥ φ1 and E (piH) =

pi∗(q¯) if φ < φ1
pi∗ (L) + φ if φ ∈ [φ1, φ0]
pi∗(H) if φ > φ0
(11)
This is explained as follows. When φ < φ1 the equilibrium has full pooling such that each
type earns pi∗(q¯), but the low type also incurs a penalty φ. When φ ∈ [φ1, φ0] the low type
is indiﬀerent between lying and truth-telling, and so earns pi∗(L). The high type, meanwhile,
earns pi∗(qeH) which is equal to pi
∗(L) + φ from (5). Finally when φ > φ0 the equilibrium has
full separation, and so each type earns its full information payoﬀ.
Remark 1. An increase in φ reduces E (piL), but increases E (piH).
Intuitively, stronger regulation increases the high type's payoﬀ because it leads buyers to
update more optimistically upon seeing a high claim. However tougher regulation hurts a low
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type because it becomes costlier to mimic a high type. Now consider expected equilibrium
proﬁt, E (Π) = xE (piL) + (1− x)E (piH):
Proposition 3. Expected proﬁt is quasiconvex in φ and minimized at φ = φ1. In addition:
i) If L < q˜, expected proﬁt is maximized by φ∗ ≥ φ0.
ii) If L ≥ q˜, expected proﬁt is maximized by either φ∗ = 0 or φ∗ ≥ φ0.
A small increase in regulation can either beneﬁt or harm the monopolist, depending upon
how existing regulation φ compares with φ1. In addition, it is straightforward to see from
(11) that φ ∈ (0, φ0) is strictly dominated under an expected proﬁt objective. This implies
that the penalty should never be paid in equilibrium. Then, given the convexity of pi∗(q), full
separation with φ∗ ≥ φ0 is always weakly optimal. Intuitively, strong regulation allows the ﬁrm
to extract buyer surplus more eﬀectively when it has high quality. Hence, if the monopolist
could credibly commit to eﬀective self-regulation (perhaps through a third party), Proposition 3
implies that it would weakly prefer to avoid using false advertising. In some circumstances, such
as when L < qˆv and H < q
∗(L), such self-regulation might be acceptable to buyers because the
monopolist's preferred level of penalty coincides with that of the buyers. This may oﬀer some
support for Europe's industry-led regulation. However, in other circumstances self-regulation
would go against buyers' preferences e.g. when L < qˆv and H > q
∗(L). Here, contrary to
any concerns that self-regulation may be too lax, the monopolist's preferred level of penalty is
strictly higher than buyers'.
4.3 Total Welfare
We now consider total welfare. Suppose that the penalty, φ, is in the form of a ﬁne which is
as valuable to the policymaker as it is to the ﬁrm. Using Proposition 1, we can write expected
total welfare as follows.
E(w) = x (1− y∗) [v∗ (L) + pi∗ (L)] + (1− x+ xy∗) [v∗ (qeH) + pi∗ (qeH)] . (12)
Notice that this expression is not just the summation of expected buyer surplus in (8), and
weighted ﬁrm-type proﬁts in (11), because by assumption the penalty has social value.
We will shortly provide conditions under which a stronger penalty φ reduces expected total
welfare. We start with some intuition and then formally state the result. The ﬁrm uses its
monopoly power to restrict output below the socially eﬃcient level. A marginal increase in
the level of false advertising y∗ then changes this output distortion in two ways. First, it
lowers the credibility of any high claim, and so forces any type with such a claim to further
reduce its output below the socially optimal level. Second however, it also induces buyers to
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over-estimate a low type's quality, thereby causing the low type to increase its output. Under
certain circumstances this latter output expansion can raise welfare and dominate the former
eﬀect12. In more detail:
∂E(w)
∂y∗
= x
[
v∗ (qeH)− v∗ (L)− (qeH − L)D(p∗(qeH)− qeH) + pi∗(qeH)− pi∗ (L)
]
︸ ︷︷ ︸
Output expansion by a ﬁrm with q = L
+ (1− x+ xy)D(p∗(qeH)− qeH)
(
1− ∂p
∗(qeH)
∂qeH
)
∂qeH
∂y∗︸ ︷︷ ︸
Output contraction by a ﬁrm with r = H
(13)
The ﬁrst term in (13) represents the change in welfare when a low type moves from reporting
r = L and generating a total surplus of v∗ (L) + pi∗ (L), to claiming r = H and generating a
surplus of v∗ (qeH) − (qeH − L)D(p∗(qeH) − qeH) + pi∗ (qeH). This term is positive if and only if L
is above a certain threshold. Intuitively, the low type's socially optimal output level D(−L) is
increasing in L. Moreover when a low type engages in false advertising, its output increases
from D (p∗(L)− L) ≤ D(−L) to D(p∗(qeH)−qeH). Therefore if L is relatively small, this `output
expansion eﬀect' goes far beyond the eﬃcient level and so is bad for welfare. However if L is
relatively large, the output expansion eﬀect brings the low type closer to the eﬃcient level, and
so is good for welfare. The second term in (13) represents the change in surplus generated by a
ﬁrm that claims to have high quality, following a small increase in y∗. As explained above, this
is unambiguously negative because an increase in y∗ reduces the credibility (and hence output)
of a ﬁrm that reports r = H. Ceteris paribus, this `output contraction eﬀect' is smaller when
quality pass-through ∂p∗(qeH)/∂q
e
H is larger since in that case the ﬁrm's output is less sensitive
to buyers' belief about its quality.
To determine which of these two output eﬀects dominates, we impose a regularity condition
that diﬀers slightly to the one used earlier.
Condition 2. Let zw(ψ) = −σ′(ψ)+[2−σ(ψ)][3−σ(ψ)]g(ψ)/[1−G(ψ)]. The demand function
satisﬁes either i) q˜ <∞ and zw(ψ) > 0 for all ψ ∈ (a, b), or ii) q˜ = −∞, q˜ =∞, zw(ψ) changesfrom negative to positive at exactly one value of ψ ∈ (a, b), and limψ→a σ(ψ) = −∞.
Condition 2 ensures that w∗(q) ≡ v∗(q) + pi∗(q) is s-shaped in quality, where
qˆw = sup
{
q ∈ (q˜, q˜) : zw(p∗(q)− q) > 0
}
(14)
denotes the critical quality level at which w∗(q) changes from being strictly convex to concave.
12The output distortions on the two types' output are reminiscent of the output eﬀects in third-degree price
discrimination (e.g. Aguirre et al 2010).
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The condition is again satisﬁed by a wide range of commonly-used distribution functions.13 We
can then state:
Lemma 4. Consider φ ∈ [φ1, φ0] and suppose that Condition 2 holds.
i) When qeH < qˆw expected total welfare is strictly increasing in φ.
ii) When L < qˆw < q
e
H expected total welfare is quasiconcave in φ. In particular there exists
a threshold L∗(qeH) < qˆw (which is weakly decreasing in q
e
H) such that expected total welfare is
strictly increasing in φ if L < L∗(qeH), but strictly decreasing in φ if L > L
∗(qeH).
iii) When L > qˆw expected total welfare is weakly decreasing in φ.
Lemma 4 can be understood as follows. When qeH < qˆw quality pass-through is relatively
small, such that the output contraction eﬀect dominates, and so E(w) decreases in the level
of false advertising y∗. When L < qˆw < qeH quality pass-through is relatively stronger, and so
the output contraction eﬀect is weaker. A small increase in y∗ therefore raises welfare provided
L is suﬃciently large, such that the expansion in the low type's output is not (too) excessive.
Finally when L is large with L > qˆw, an increase in the penalty can never raise welfare as the
output expansion always weakly dominates.
In a model with one ﬁrm type and naive buyers, Glaeser and Ujhelyi (2010) show that some
false advertising always improves total welfare by increasing output towards the social optimum.
Our welfare result with two types and rational buyers is more complex for the following reasons.
First, since in our model the low type must pool with the high type, the increase in its output,
D(p∗(qeH)−qeH)−D(p∗(L)−L), may actually go beyond the social optimum and reduce welfare.
Second, since in our model false advertising reduces the credibility of high claims, there is
another welfare-reducing `output contraction eﬀect' which is not present in their paper.
Now consider the implications for the optimal penalty. To ease exposition, we focus on the
(more interesting) case where L < qˆw. First, note that the policymaker will always eliminate
false advertising with φ∗ ≥ φ0 when H < qˆw. This follows from Lemma 4 because qeH < qˆw for
all y∗ ∈ [0, 1]. For the remaining cases:
Proposition 4. Fix L < qˆw < H and suppose that Condition 2 holds. The welfare-optimal
penalty, φ∗, is characterized as follows:
i) When L ≤ L∗(H), φ∗ ≥ φ0 such that y∗ = 0.
ii) When L ∈ (L∗(H), L∗(q¯)), φ∗ induces y∗ ∈ (0, 1) such that qeH = q∗∗ where L = L∗(q∗∗).
iii) When L ∈ [L∗(q¯), qˆw), φ∗ ≤ φ1 such that y∗ = 1 .
13Condition 2i holds for all demands with constant curvature, where qˆw = q˜ < ∞ such that w∗(q) is strictly
convex for q ∈ (q˜, qˆw) and linear for q ≥ q˜w. Condition 2ii is satisﬁed by some demands with increasingcurvature, including the Normal, Weibull, and Type I Extreme Value, where qˆw solves zw (p∗(q)− q) = 0 such
that w∗(q) is strictly convex for q < qˆw but strictly concave for q > qˆw. See Section A of the Supplementary
Appendix.
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Proposition 4 provides parameter conditions to show when a positive level of false advertising
is welfare-optimal. Even though full separation with φ∗ ≥ φ0 involves full information prices
and no output distortions, it may still be optimal to use false advertising to induce some form
of pooling. In line with intuition, one can show that the optimal level of false advertising is
weakly lower than that under a buyer surplus objective. However, the optimal level of false
advertising remains increasing in the `healthiness' of the market (e.g. L, H, and (1− x)).14
5 Endogenous Quality Investment
We now extend the main model to examine some additional eﬀects of false advertising in a
market with endogenous product quality. Such eﬀects have been largely ignored within the
literature. However they are important to consider because the existence of false advertising
may reduce the incentives to invest in product quality by limiting the credibility of advertising.
Suppose that the ﬁrm is initially endowed with low quality L, but can upgrade to high quality
H by paying an investment cost C. This cost is drawn privately from a distribution F (C) on
(0,∞), with corresponding density f(C) > 0. The move order is then as follows. At stage
1 the policymaker commits to a penalty φ. At stage 2 the ﬁrm learns its investment cost C,
and privately chooses whether to upgrade. It also announces its report and price. The game
then proceeds as in the main model, with buyers making their purchase decisions, and the
policymaker instigating any potential penalties. Let x∗(φ) denote the endogenous probability
that the ﬁrm has low quality.
There always exists a trivial equilibrium in which x∗(φ) = 1. If buyers believe that product
quality is low for all reports and prices, the ﬁrm has no incentive to invest. However, in general,
there also exist other alternative PBE. Henceforth, we restrict attention to PBE where, as
before, buyer beliefs only depend upon the ﬁrm's claim. Moreover whenever possible, we select
an equilibrium where the ﬁrm invests with positive probability.
Lemma 5. i) When φ = 0 all equilibria have x∗(φ) = 1. ii) When φ ∈ (0, φ0] there is a unique
equilibrium (up to oﬀ-path beliefs) satisfying our restrictions, with x∗ = 1 − F (φ) ∈ (0, 1) and
r(H) = H.
Intuitively, an increase in φ induces investment by widening the gap in proﬁts earned by
high and low quality ﬁrms. In more detail, when φ = 0 buyers cannot distinguish between
high and low quality. The ﬁrm earns the same proﬁt regardless and therefore chooses not to
14Finally, we note that false advertising can remain optimal even when a fraction τ of the penalty is `lost'
and does not contribute to total welfare. For instance when L∗(q¯) < L < qˆw ≤ q¯ the optimal penalty induces
y∗ = 1 for all τ ∈ [0, 1]. The only diﬀerence is that when τ = 0 any φ ∈ [0, φ1] maximizes total welfare, whereas
when τ > 0 it is more attractive to reduce the penalties incurred, so φ∗ = 0 is the unique optimum.
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invest. Alternatively when φ ≥ φ0, claims are fully credible. A low quality ﬁrm reports r = L
and earns pi∗(L), whilst a high quality ﬁrm reports r = H and earns pi∗(H). Since the gains
from investing are pi∗(H) − pi∗(L) ≡ φ0, the ﬁrm upgrades if and only if C ≤ φ0. Finally
when φ ∈ (0, φ0), the level of false advertising is necessarily positive for the same reason as
in the main model. This further implies that a high quality product earns φ more than a low
quality product such that the ﬁrm invests with probability F (φ). However unlike the main
model, the probability of false advertising y∗ is not necessarily decreasing everywhere in φ.
Recall the deﬁnition qeH ≡ E(q|r = H). Intuitively, an increase in φ can enhance advertising
credibility and cause investment to increase by so much that, ceteris paribus, the net gains from
false advertising, pi∗(qeH)− φ, actually rise, and prompt a higher y∗. In his seminal discussion,
Nelson (1974) suggested that advertising policy may increase the credibility of false advertising.
Here, we formalize an even stronger relationship - policy can provide so much credibility that
parameters exist where the probability of false advertising is increasing in the level of penalty.
Nevertheless, despite any potential increase in y∗, stronger penalties still always induce a larger
expected quality, qeH . Now consider the optimal penalty:
Proposition 5. Suppose Condition 1 holds and that L < qˆv. A buyer-orientated policymaker
i) always sets φ > 0, and ii) sets φ < φ0 such that y
∗ > 0 provided H > q∗(L) and f(φ0)/F (φ0)
is suﬃciently small.
To understand this result, rewrite (8) from earlier using x ≡ x∗(φ) as
E(v) = v∗(L) + (H − L)v
∗(qeH)− v∗(L)
qeH − L︸ ︷︷ ︸
Price/Persuasion terms
× (1− x∗(φ))︸ ︷︷ ︸
Investment term
. (15)
The second term captures the tradeoﬀ between the price and persuasion eﬀects. As in the main
model, Condition 1 ensures that this term is increasing in φ if and only if qeH < q
∗(L). The third
term relates to a new `investment eﬀect'. A high quality product generates more buyer surplus
than a low quality product. Therefore ceteris paribus, an increase in φ is beneﬁcial since it
prompts a higher level of investment. Proposition 5 is then explained as follows. Firstly, unlike
in the main model, φ = 0 is never optimal because the ﬁrm then never invests and so buyers get
only v∗(L). Alternatively, for any φ > 0, the ﬁrm invests with positive probability and so from
(15) buyer surplus strictly exceeds v∗(L). Secondly though, despite this new investment eﬀect,
policy may still refrain from completely eliminating false advertising. In particular, this is the
case when H > q∗(L) and f(φ0)/F (φ0) is relatively small. Intuitively the latter restriction on
f(C) implies that starting from strong regulation, φ = φ0, a small decrease in φ only has a
small eﬀect on the investment probability, such that the combined price and persuasion eﬀects
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dominate. Consequently, as in the main model, false advertising can sometimes beneﬁt buyers.15
Finally, one can compare the optimal penalty with that under exogenous quality. In par-
ticular, let φ∗en denote the optimal penalty with endogenous quality, and impose a technical
condition f(φ)(H − L) < 1 to ensure it is unique. Then, to make a comparison, let x∗ (φ∗en) be
the proportion of low types under exogenous quality, and denote the associated optimal penalty
by φ∗ex. One can then prove that φ
∗
ex ≤ φ∗en, such that the optimal penalty is stronger when
quality is endogenous due to the existence of the investment eﬀect.
6 Robustness
This ﬁnal section shows how the results of the main model are robust to i) an arbitrary number
of quality types, ii) asymmetric costs, and iii) competition.
6.1 An Arbitrary Number of Types
Suppose there are now n > 2 quality levels, denoted by q1 < ... < qn, and that the ﬁrm has
quality qi with probability xi ∈ (0, 1). To simplify the exposition, let q2 > q˜ and qn−1 < qˆv(relaxing these assumptions is straightforward, but adds no new insights). Marginal cost is the
same for all types and normalized to zero, while ex ante expected quality is again denoted by
q¯ =
∑
xiqi. The ﬁrm may send any report from the set Q = {q1, ..., qn}, and the policymaker
can commit to a richer penalty φ(q, r) ≥ 0, which depends on both the ﬁrm's actual and
reported qualities. We assume that the ﬁrm can only be ﬁned if it over-reports its quality i.e.
φ(q, r) = 0 for all r ≤ q. The game and move order are otherwise unchanged.
As usual, for any particular penalty φ(q, r) there may exist a large number of PBE. There-
fore, for reasons analogous to the main model, we continue to restrict attention to PBE in which
i) r(q) ≥ q ∀q such that no type under-reports its quality, and ii) buyer beliefs depend on the
ﬁrm's claim but not its price. Notice that in any PBE satisfying these restrictions, the penalty
function φ(q, r) induces a mapping from quality types into reports. It is then convenient to
let y∗i,j be the probability that a ﬁrm of type i claims to have quality j; hence y
∗
i,i denotes the
probability that ﬁrm type i sends a truthful report. Letting y∗ be the (triangular) matrix of
such probabilities, we may then state:
15Similarly, one can show that a welfare-maximizing policymaker may also refrain from completely eradicating
false advertising.
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Lemma 6. The optimal penalty can be derived in two steps:
i) First, choose the matrix of probabilities y∗ which maximizes the policymaker's objective.
ii) Second, there exists a penalty function φ(q, r) which induces the policymaker's optimal y∗ as
the unique equilibrium outcome of the game.
Thus conceptually the problem is similar to the two-type case. In particular, analogous to
Lemma 2, we can work with the matrix of report probabilities y∗, and be sure that at least
one penalty function can implement the desired y∗. Now consider optimal penalties. Given our
main model, it is not surprising that under certain conditions the policymaker will permit some
false advertising. However once there is an arbitrary number of types, the policymaker also has
to decide which quality types will be allowed to engage in false advertising, and which quality
level(s) they will mimic. To simplify the exposition we now focus on distributions satisfying
Conditions 1i and 2i for which qˆv = qˆw = q˜
16:
Proposition 6. Suppose the match distribution satisﬁes Conditions 1i and 2i. The optimal
report probabilities are as follows:
i) Buyer surplus. (a) When qn ≤ q˜ it is maximized by y∗i,i = 1 for all i. (b) When qn > q˜ > q¯
there exists a critical type i∗ satisfying E(q|q ≥ qi∗) ≤ q˜ < E(q|q ≥ qi∗+1), such that the optimal
solution has y∗i,i = 1 for all i < i
∗, y∗i,n = 1 for all i > i
∗, and y∗i∗,i∗ = 1 − y∗i∗,n where y∗i∗,n
satisﬁes:
xi∗y
∗
i∗,nqi∗ +
∑n
i=i∗+1 xiqi
xi∗y∗i∗,n +
∑n
i=i∗+1 xi
= q˜.
(c) When q¯ ≥ q˜ it is maximized by y∗i,n = 1 for all i.
ii) Proﬁt is maximized by y∗i,i = 1 for all i.
iii) Total welfare. There exists a threshold L∗ such that: (a) When qn ≤ q˜ it is maximized by
y∗i,i = 1 for all i. (b) When qn > q˜ and qi∗ ≥ L∗ it is maximized by the buyer-optimal matrix.
(c) When qn > q˜ and qi∗ < L
∗, it is maximized by y∗i,i = 1 for all i with qi < L
∗, and y∗i,n = 1
for all i with qi ≥ L∗.
The policymaker induces each ﬁrm type to either report truthfully or to claim to have
the highest possible quality qn. Similar to the two-type model, in many cases one ﬁrm type is
required to randomize over its report. Whether buyers gain from false advertising depends upon
how the highest quality type qn compares with q˜. If qn ≤ q˜ the persuasion eﬀect dominates,
such that buyers are better oﬀ if the ﬁrm truthfully reveals its quality. However if qn > q˜, the
highest type has a lot of market power, and so lower types are pooled with it to generate a
beneﬁcial price eﬀect. In order to minimize the negative persuasion eﬀect, this pooling is done
16The optimal pattern of false advertising is qualitatively the same for distributions satisfying the alternative
Conditions 1ii and 2ii. Further details are available on request.
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from the top i.e. ﬁrst the qn−1 type is pooled, then the qn−2 type, and so forth, until either
E(q|r = qn) = q˜ or no more types are left to pool. Hence the optimum has full pooling when
q¯ > q˜, and semi-pooling when q¯ < q˜ < H . In the latter case, the policymaker permits `small'
lies by types close to qn, whilst forbidding `large' lies by types at or close to q1.
Policy under a total welfare objective also depends upon whether qn ≷ q˜. When qn ≤ q˜ a
welfare-maximizing policy involves truthful advertising and so coincides with what is optimal
for both buyers and the ﬁrm. However when qn > q˜ a welfare-oriented policymaker may allow
some lower types to use false advertising in order to raise their output. As with buyer surplus,
types with quality closer to qn are more likely to be allowed to use false advertising since their
socially-optimal output levels are highest. Overall, the main insights from the two-type model
carry over into this richer multi-type environment.
6.2 Asymmetric Costs
Returning to the two-type case, we now permit the types to diﬀer in marginal costs. In partic-
ular, suppose that a product of quality q now has constant marginal cost c(q) with c′(q) ∈ (0, 1)
and c′′(q) = 0. Let pi (p, qe; i) = (p− c(i)) [1−G (p− qe)] be the proﬁt earned with price p,
expected quality qe, and actual quality i ∈ {L,H}, and denote p∗ (qe; i) = arg maxp pi (p, qe; i)
and pi∗(i) = pi (p∗ (i; i) , i; i).
Common reﬁnements now make sharper predictions, but as we discuss, these are unappealing
in the context of our framework. First, reﬁnements like D1 uniquely select a least-cost separating
equilibrium. Here, the low type always reports truthfully and sets its full-information price
p∗(L;L). When pi∗(L) ≥ pi(p∗(H;H), H;L) − φ, the high type sends r = H and charges its
full-information price p∗(H;H). When pi∗(L) < pi(p∗(H;H), H;L) − φ, the high type sends
r = H and charges the highest price consistent with pi(p,H;L)− φ = pi∗(L) such that the low
type just prefers to advertise truthfully. However, for our purposes, a major disadvantage of
this equilibrium is that the low type always reports truthfully, and hence no false advertising
occurs. Mailath et al (1993) also provide a number of wider arguments against the de facto use
of reﬁnements like D1 to select least-cost separating equilibria. Second, Mailath et al 's (1993)
Undefeated Equilibrium reﬁnement has relatively little bite. Nevertheless, a stronger version
proposed by Mezzetti and Tsoulouhas (2000) selects either a full separating equilibrium or a full
pooling equilibrium, depending on the penalty φ and the ex ante probability that quality is low.
However, as discussed earlier, while a full pooling equilibrium does allow for false advertising,
it does not allow for the potentially more realistic case where false claims inﬂate buyers' beliefs
beyond their priors.
Therefore we now characterize an alternative semi-pooling equilibrium in a similar style to
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the main model. First, we only consider equilibria where the high type reports truthfully. Since
it is costless for a high type to claim r = H, only `perverse' buyer beliefs could force a high
type to make a low claim. Secondly, if the low type reports r = H in equilibrium, then it
must charge the same price as the high type otherwise buyers would correctly infer its type.
However, conditional on reporting r = H, the two types' payoﬀs now diﬀer by more than just a
constant, and so the argument we used in the main model must be modiﬁed. Thirdly then, we
proceed as follows. Suppose that buyers expect the low type to report r = H with probability
y∗ ∈ (0, 1], and interpret any oﬀ-path price as a possible signal about the ﬁrm's type but not
about y∗. We then restrict attention to PBE where, conditional on reporting r = H, the ﬁrm
charges the high type's preferred price, p∗(qeH ;H). One justiﬁcation for this is that since the
high type is the one being mimicked, it should have some `leadership' in choosing its preferred
pooling price.17 We may then state:
Lemma 7. Suppose c(H)− c(L) is not too large. There is a unique semi-pooling PBE (up to
oﬀ-path beliefs) satisfying our restrictions, in which:
i) A high type ﬁrm claims r = H and charges p∗(qeH ;H).
ii) A low type ﬁrm randomizes. With probability y∗ it claims r = H and charges p∗(qeH ;H).
With probability 1− y∗ it claims r = L and charges p∗(L;L).
- When φ ≤ φ′1 ≡ pi∗(p∗(q¯;H), q¯;L)− pi∗(L), y∗ = 1.
- When φ ≥ φ′0 = pi∗(p∗(H;H), H;L)− pi∗(L), y∗ = 0.
- When φ ∈ (φ′1, φ′0), y∗ ∈ (0, 1) and uniquely solves
pi∗(p∗(qeH ;H), q
e
H ;L)− φ = pi∗(L). (16)
iii) qeH is given by (6). Buyer beliefs are such that Pr (q = H|{r, p} = {H, p∗(qeH ;H)}) = 1−x1−x+xy∗
and Pr (q = H|{r, p} 6= {H, p∗(qeH ;H)}) = 0.
This equilibrium is qualitatively similar to the one derived earlier in the main model. In
particular for intermediate values of the penalty φ false advertising arises in equilibrium, and
yet high advertised claims are still partially informative and thus induce buyers to positively
update their prior belief about quality. We also note that equilibrium play varies smoothly
with both φ and c(H), and converges to that of the main model as c(H)→ c(L).
Finally, we now brieﬂy comment on the implications for policy. Suppose that c(H) − c(L)
is not too large. Relative to symmetric costs, there is now an additional reason to eradicate
17Another justiﬁcation is as follows. Suppose again that buyers interpret any oﬀ-path price as a possible signal
about the ﬁrm's type but not about y∗. Then, provided c(H)− c(L) is not too large, Mezzetti and Tsoulouhas's
(2000) Strongly Undefeated Equilibrium reﬁnement uniquely predicts that the ﬁrm should charge p∗ (qeH ;H)
when reporting r = H.
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false advertising. Under asymmetric costs, a lying low type must distort its price upwards at
p∗ (qeH ;H) instead of its preferred (lower) price p
∗ (qeH ;L). This distortion provides a further
loss to buyer surplus, total welfare, and ex ante proﬁts. Nevertheless under Conditions 1 and
2, it remains true that for certain values of L, H, and x both a buyer- and a welfare-oriented
policymaker would permit a strictly positive level of false advertising.
6.3 Competition
This ﬁnal subsection introduces competition into the main model. Suppose an established
incumbent, I, with quality qI , competes against an entrant, E, with quality, qE. Product
diﬀerentiation is modeled using a Hotelling line such that a buyer with location z ∈ [0, 1] can
gain UI(z) = qI − pI − tz or UE(z) = qE − pE − t(1− z) from trading with the respective ﬁrms.
While the incumbent's product quality is known, the entrant's quality is private information.
Speciﬁcally, the entrant's product quality equals L with probability x ∈ (0, 1) and H > L with
probability 1−x, such that the entrant's ex ante average quality level equals q¯ = xL+(1−x)H.
Let all marginal costs be zero, and the buyers' outside option be suﬃciently poor such that
buyers always buy. The game then proceeds with i) the policymaker publicly selecting φ, ii)
the entrant learning its quality and issuing a report r ∈ {L,H}, iii) the entrant and incumbent
simultaneously selecting their prices, pE and pI , iv) buyers making their purchase decisions,
and v) the policymaker administering any potential penalties.
To begin, consider a benchmark case where qE is public information. The Nash equilibrium
price charged by ﬁrm i ∈ {I, E} is then
p∗i (qi, q−i) =

0 if qi ≤ qi˜
t+
(
qi−q−i
3
)
if qi ∈
(
qi˜, q˜i
)
qi − q−i − t if qi ≥ q˜i
(17)
where qi˜ = q−i − 3t and q˜i = q−i + 3t. Intuitively, when qi ≤ qi˜ ﬁrm i is uncompetitive so itsprice is driven down to marginal cost. When instead qi ∈ (qi˜, q˜i), both ﬁrms are active. Here,an increase in qi shifts out ﬁrm i's demand curve at the expense of its rival, prompting ﬁrm i
to charge more and its rival to charge less. Finally, when qi ≥ q˜i, ﬁrm i's product is so strong
that it monopolizes the whole market; ﬁrm i then sets its price such that the marginal buyer
is indiﬀerent about buying from it. In addition, one can show that ﬁrm i's equilibrium proﬁt,
pi∗i (qi, q−i), is increasing in its own quality qi, and decreasing in that of its rival q−i.
Now let the entrant's product quality be private information. As consistent with the main
model, we restrict attention to PBE where i) the high entrant type always issues a high report,
and ii) buyer beliefs do not depend on price.
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Lemma 8. There exists a unique semi-pooling equilibrium (up to oﬀ-path beliefs) satisfying our
restrictions, in which:
i) The probability with which a low quality entrant reports r = H, y∗, is the same as in Propo-
sition 1ii) after replacing pi∗(z) with pi∗E(z, qI).
ii) The ﬁrms charge p∗E(L, qI) and p
∗
I(qI , L) respectively if the entrant reports r = L; and
p∗E(q
e
H , qI) and p
∗
I(qI , q
e
H) if the entrant reports r = H.
iii) Buyer beliefs are similar to Proposition 1iii) i.e. following a report r = H, buyers expect
the entrant to have quality qeH =
xy∗L+(1−x)H
1−x+xy∗ .
There exists a semi-pooling equilibrium which is qualitatively the same as under monopoly
where a low quality entrant randomizes between lying and reporting truthfully. Buyers update
their beliefs about entrant quality accordingly, and conditional on those beliefs, the two ﬁrms
charge Nash equilibrium prices.
Now consider the optimal penalty, starting with an industry proﬁts objective. One can verify
that both the entrant and the incumbent weakly prefer y∗ = 0, with a strict preference whenever
L < q˜E. Hence, like the monopoly case, an industry self-regulator would choose to completely
eliminate false advertising with the use of a tough policy φ∗ ≥ φ0 ≡ pi∗E(H, qI)− pi∗E(L, qI).
We now consider buyer surplus and total welfare. Here, in order to demonstrate that a
policymaker may still permit a positive level of false advertising, it is suﬃcient to focus on the
case where the entrant always has positive market share, with L ≥ qE˜. First, consider buyersurplus.
Proposition 7. When L ≥ qE˜ the buyer-optimal level of false advertising y∗ is the same as inProposition 2 after replacing qˆv and q∗(L) with q˜E.
To understand this result, write
∂E(v)
∂y∗
= x [v∗(qI , qeH)− (qeH − L)D∗E(qeH , qI)− v∗(qI , L)]
− (1− x+ xy∗)∂q
e
H
∂y∗
[
D∗I (qI , q
e
H)
∂p∗I(qI , q
e
H)
∂qeH
+D∗E(q
e
H , qI)
∂p∗E(q
e
H , qI)
∂qeH
]
, (18)
where D∗I (qI , q
e
H) and D
∗
E(q
e
H , qI) are the respective equilibrium demands. The ﬁrst term is
a revised `persuasion' eﬀect which measures the change in buyer surplus generated by a low
quality entrant when it changes its report from r = L to r = H. As usual, a low type entrant
uses false advertising to induce buyers to buy too many units, at an inﬂated price. However,
false advertising now also allows the low type entrant to compete more eﬀectively, which reduces
the incumbent's price from p∗I(qI , L) to p
∗
I(qI , q
e
H). The second term is a revised `price' eﬀect.
Conditional on the entrant using a high claim, an increase in lying reduces qeH and prompts
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the entrant to charge a (weakly) lower price, but allows the incumbent to select a (weakly)
higher price. This net price eﬀect need no longer beneﬁt buyers - it is beneﬁcial if and only if
the entrant's market share exceeds 0.5, which is equivalent to qeH ≥ qI . However, in aggregate,
the optimal penalty remains qualitatively similar to that under monopoly. In particular, false
advertising remains optimal when H > q˜E in order to weaken the high type entrant's market
power.
Now consider total welfare. From above, it is optimal to set φ∗ ≥ φ0 to induce y∗ = 0 when
H ≤ q˜E as this is preferred by all parties. For the remaining cases, we can state:
Proposition 8. When L ≥ qE˜ the welfare-optimal y∗ is the same as in Proposition 4 aftersubstituting q˜E for qˆw, and L∗E = qI + 3t/5 for L∗(H) and L∗(q¯).
This can be understood as follows. Firstly, an increase in y∗ expands the output of a low type
entrant. As with monopoly, this can either increase or decrease welfare depending on the level
of L. Secondly, an increase in y∗ reduces qeH , and therefore decreases the output of an entrant
who reports r = H. However unlike monopoly, this second eﬀect can actually increase welfare
because, under competition, the ﬁrm with the highest (expected) quality uses its market power
to restrict its output below the socially eﬃcient level. Hence when qeH ∈ (qE˜, qI) an entrantwho reports r = H actually overproduces, and so a small reduction in its output is socially
beneﬁcial. The proposition then shows that the aggregate of these two eﬀects is qualitatively
similar to monopoly. In particular, false advertising is used if and only if H > q˜E and L is
relatively large with L ≥ L∗E in order to raise the output of a low type entrant.
7 Conclusions
Despite its prevalence and policy importance, false advertising remains under-studied. This
paper presents a model where false claims arise in equilibrium and actively inﬂuence the pur-
chase decisions of rational buyers. By utilizing some results on demand curvature, the paper
provides precise conditions under which buyers and society beneﬁt from a positive level of false
advertising due its eﬀects in counteracting monopoly power. These results are extended in
various directions, including cases where the ﬁrm faces competition or where product quality
is endogenous.
Future work to further understand false advertising and advertising policy would be useful
in a number of avenues. First, our paper focuses on markets where buyers are only able to
assess a product's value with suﬃcient delay, such that policy plays a key role in regulating
advertising. It would be interesting to extend our model to consider other contexts where
regulation interacts with alternative sources of credibility, such as seller reputation. Second, our
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model considers a single market. More broadly, it would be useful to consider how a resource-
constrained policymaker should regulate across multiple heterogeneous markets. Finally, much
work remains in building on our analysis to study other types of false advertising, such as ﬁrms'
misleading price claims.
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Appendix
Proof of Lemma 1. i) If q ≤ q˜ demand is zero for all p ≥ 0, so proﬁt is weakly maximized atp∗ = 0. ii) If q > q˜ proﬁt is strictly increasing in p < a + q, therefore the optimal price mustsatisfy p∗ ≥ a+ q. At an interior solution, the ﬁrst order condition is
1− pg (p− q)/ [1−G (p− q)] = 0. (19)
a) When q ∈
(
q˜, q˜
)
the left-hand side of (19) is strictly positive at p→ a+ q, strictly negative
as p → b + q, and strictly decreasing in p because 1 − G(ε) is logconcave. Hence a unique
p∗ solves equation (19). Deﬁne σ(ψ) = −[1 − G(ψ)]g′(ψ)/g(ψ)2. Diﬀerentiating (19) gives
∂p∗(q)/∂q = (1 − σ(p∗(q) − q))/(2 − σ(p∗(q) − q)), which lies in [0, 1) because logconcavity of
1−G(ε) implies σ(ψ) ≤ 1. b). When q ≥ q˜ the lefthand side of (19) is strictly negative at all
p > a+ q and hence p∗ = a+ q.
Proof of Proposition 1. The proof proceeds in several steps. a) Beliefs depend only on the
ﬁrm's report, so deﬁne βei = Pr (q = H|r = i) and qei = (1− βei )L + βeiH for i ∈ {L,H}. b)
Conditional on its report and buyer beliefs, the ﬁrm's price must maximize its proﬁt. So given
a report r = i for i ∈ {L,H}, the ﬁrm charges p∗(qei ). c) As y∗ = Pr (r(L) = H), Bayes' rule
implies βeH = (1 − x)/(1 − x + xy∗), and βeL = 0 if y∗ < 1. However, Bayes' rule places no
restriction on βeL if y
∗ = 1. d) y∗ must be consistent with the low type behaving optimally.
Firstly given y∗ = 0, r = L is weakly dominant iﬀ φ ≥ φ0. Secondly given y∗ = 1, reporting
r = H is weakly dominant iﬀ φ ≤ pi∗(q¯) − pi∗ (qeL) i.e. for any φ ≤ φ1 given an appropriate
oﬀ-path belief βeL. Thirdly given y
∗ ∈ (0, 1), the low type must be indiﬀerent between r = L
and r = H i.e. (5) must hold. Moreover y∗ ∈ (0, 1) implies qeH ∈ (q¯, H), such that equation (5)
cannot hold for φ /∈ (φ1, φ0), but has a unique solution for any φ ∈ (φ1, φ0). e) Finally, given
buyer beliefs, it is indeed optimal for the high type to report r = H.
Proof of Lemma 3. Recall that y∗ strictly decreases in φ ∈ [φ1, φ0]. Using (6) and (8):
∂E(v)
∂y∗
= x
[
v∗ (qeH)− v∗(L)−
dv∗ (qeH)
dq
× (qeH − L)
]
, (20)
i) Consider L < qˆv. a) Under Condition 1i dv
∗(q)/dq, d2v∗(q)/dq2 > 0 for q ∈ (q˜, q˜), anddv∗(q)/dq = 0 for q > q˜. Hence (20) is strictly negative (positive) for qeH below (above)
q∗(L) = q˜. b) Under Condition 1ii we have the following results. First, (20) is strictly negative
when qeH ≤ qˆv because d2v∗(q)/dq2 > 0 for all q ∈ (q˜, qˆv). Second, (20) is strictly increasing in
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qeH when q
e
H > qˆv because in that region d
2v∗(qeH)/dq
2 < 0. Third, (20) is strictly positive for
suﬃciently high qeH . To see this, note that dv
∗(q)/dq = [1−G(p∗(q)− q)]/ [2− σ(p∗(q)− q)],
hence dv∗(L)/dq > 0, and also limq→∞ dv∗(q)/dq = 0 because limq→∞ p∗(q) − q = a and
limψ→a σ(ψ) = −∞. Therefore since v∗(q) is strictly convex for q < qˆv and strictly concave for
q > qˆv, we infer that for suﬃciently high q
e
H we have dv
∗(qeH)/dq < dv
∗(z)/dq for all z ∈ (L, qeH).
Rewriting (20) as x
´ qeH
L
((dv∗(z)/dq)− (dv∗(qeH)/dq)) dz shows that (20) is strictly positive for
suﬃciently high qeH . Fourth then, (20) has a unique root which we denote by q
∗(L) > qˆv, and
is strictly negative (positive) for qeH below (above) q
∗(L). Fifth, note that q∗(L) is strictly
decreasing in L because dv∗(q∗(L))/dq > dv∗(L)/dq and so (20) is strictly increasing in L.
Also note that limL→qˆv q
∗(L) = qˆv. Finally since qeH increases in φ, it is immediate that under
Condition 1 E(v) is quasiconcave in φ. ii) Consider L > qˆv. Given Condition 1, v
∗(q) is weakly
increasing and concave in q ≥ qˆv, so (20) is weakly positive.
Proof of Proposition 2. i) Note that qeH ≤ q∗(L) for all φ, so by Lemma 3 E(v) is maximized
at φ∗ ≥ φ0. ii) Note that qeH < q∗(L) when φ < pi∗(q∗(L)) − pi∗(L), and qeH > q∗(L) when
φ > pi∗(q∗(L)) − pi∗(L). Hence from Lemma, 3 E(v) is maximized at φ∗ = pi∗(q∗(L)) − pi∗(L)
such that qeH = q
∗(L). iii) Note that qeH ≥ q∗(L) for all φ, hence by Lemma 3 E(v) is maximized
at φ∗ ≤ φ1. Finally, Proposition 1 gives the associated optimal y∗ for each case.
Proof of Corollary 1. Using Proposition 2 optimal false advertising is
y∗ = min
{
max
{
(H − q∗(L))(1− x)
(H − q∗(L))(1− x) + q∗(L)− q¯ , 0
}
, 1
}
. (21)
Recall from the proof of Lemma 3 that q∗(L) is weakly decreasing in L. Hence (21) is weakly
increasing in L, H, and (1− x).
Proof of Proposition 3. Given E (Π) = xE (piL) + (1− x)E (piH), it is immediate from (11)
that a) E(Π) = pi∗(q¯)− xφ when φ < φ1, b) E(Π) = pi∗ (L) + (1− x)φ when φ ∈ [φ1, φ0], and
c) E(Π) = xpi∗(L) + (1− x)pi∗(H) when φ > φ0. Hence E(Π) is quasiconvex, minimized at φ1,
and cannot be maximized at any φ ∈ (0, φ0). Then for part i), φ = φ0 strictly dominates φ = 0
because pi∗(q) is convex everywhere and strictly convex for q ∈
(
q˜, q˜
)
. For part ii) note that
pi∗(q) = a+ q for all q ≥ q˜, and hence E(Π) = a+ q¯ for any φ ∈ {0} ∪ [φ0,∞).
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Proof of Lemma 4. Recall that y∗ strictly decreases in φ ∈ [φ1, φ0]. Using equation (12):
∂E(w)
∂y∗
= x
[
w∗ (qeH)− w∗(L)−
dw∗ (qeH)
dq
× (qeH − L)
]
. (22)
where w∗(q) = v∗(q) +pi∗(q). i) When qeH < qˆw (22) is strictly negative because w
∗(q) is strictly
convex for all q ∈
(
q˜, qˆw
)
. ii) Consider L < qˆw < q
e
H , and deﬁne Lˇ < qˆw as the unique solution
to dw∗(Lˇ)/dq = dw∗(qeH)/dq. First, (22) is strictly increasing in L < Lˇ and strictly decreasing in
L > Lˇ. Second, (22) is continuous in L around qˆw, and (weakly) positive at L = qˆw because by
Condition 2 w∗(q) is weakly concave for q > qˆw. Third, (22) is strictly negative for suﬃciently
low L. To prove this, note that (22) is proportional to
w∗(qeH)−w∗(L)
qeH−L −
dw∗(qeH)
dq
. Fixing qeH ,
there exists a δ > 0 such that
dw∗(qeH)
dq
> δ. Moreover
w∗(qeH)−w∗(L)
qeH−L is weakly less than
w∗(qeH)
qeH−L ,
which in turn is strictly less than δ for suﬃciently low L. Fourth then, (22) has a unique root
L∗(qeH) < Lˇ, and is strictly negative (positive) for L below (above) L
∗(qeH). Note also that
L∗(qeH) is weakly decreasing in q
e
H .
18 Therefore, since qeH increases in φ, E(w) is quasiconcave in
φ. iii) When L > qˆw (22) is weakly positive because w
∗(q) is weakly concave for all q > qˆw.
Proof of Proposition 4. This follows directly from Lemma 4 and its proof. Recall that
L∗(qeH) is weakly decreasing in q
e
H . i) Since L ≤ L∗(qeH) for all y∗ ∈ [0, 1], E(w) is maximized at
y∗ = 0. ii) Since L > L∗(qeH) for q
e
H > q
∗∗, and L < L∗(qeH) for q
e
H < q
∗∗, E(w) is maximized by
the unique y∗ such that qeH = q
∗∗. iii) Since L ≥ L∗(qeH) for all y∗ ∈ [0, 1], E(w) is maximized
at y∗ = 1.
Proof of Lemma 5. Part i) follows from arguments in the text. For part ii) look for an
equilibrium in which a positive measure of types invest. Since pi∗(H) − pi∗(L) < ∞ not all
types invest, hence x∗(φ) ∈ (0, 1). Since the ﬁrm's payoﬀ following r = L is independent of
q, any ﬁrm reporting r = L must have low quality; equivalently, r(H) = H. Firstly, in any
equilibrium with y∗ = 0 a ﬁrm with q = L earns φ0 less than a ﬁrm with q = H. Secondly, in
any equilibrium with y∗ > 0 a ﬁrm with q = L earns φ less than a ﬁrm with q = H, such that
x∗(φ) = 1 − F (φ). a) Consider φ = φ0. There is clearly an equilibrium with y∗ = 0. There is
no equilibrium with y∗ > 0, since pi∗(qeH) − φ0 < pi∗(H) − φ0 = pi∗(L), such that no ﬁrm with
q = L would want to report r = H. b) Consider φ ∈ (0, φ0). There is no equilibrium with
y∗ = 0, since pi∗(qeH)− φ = pi∗(H)− φ > pi∗(L), such that a ﬁrm with q = L would deviate and
18Under Condition 2i w∗(q) is linear in q > qˆw = q˜ such that L∗(qeH) in invariant to q
e
H and is the lowest
solution to v∗ (q˜)− v∗(L) + a− pi∗ (L) +L = 0. Under Condition 2ii L∗(qeH) is strictly decreasing in qeH because
the righthand side of (22) is strictly increasing in both L = L∗(qeH) and q
e
H .
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report r = H. Therefore look for an equilibrium with y∗ > 0: the gain to a ﬁrm with q = L
from reporting r = H instead of r = L is pi∗(qeH) − φ − pi∗(L). Using x∗(φ) = 1 − F (φ), this
equals:
pi∗
(
L+ (H − L) F (φ)
F (φ) + y∗ (1− F (φ))
)
− φ− pi∗(L). (23)
This is continuous and strictly decreasing in y∗, and is strictly positive at y∗ = 0. If (23)
is weakly positive at y∗ = 1 it is strictly positive at all y∗ ∈ [0, 1), hence there is a unique
equilibrium with y∗ = 1. If (23) is strictly negative at y∗ = 1, there exists a unique equilibrium
with y∗ ∈ (0, 1) which makes (23) equal to zero.
Proof of Proposition 5. i) The proof that φ = 0 is never optimal is given in the text after
the proposition. ii) It is enough to show that ∂E(v)/∂φ|φ=φ0 < 0. Note that for φ > 0,
pi∗ (qeH(φ)) = max {pi∗(L) + φ, pi∗ (L+ (H − L)F (φ))} , (24)
where the ﬁrst part applies when y∗ ∈ (0, 1), and the second part applies when y∗ = 1. Equation
(24) implies that for some small δ > 0, pi∗ (qeH(φ)) = pi
∗(L) + φ for all φ ∈ [φ0 − δ, φ0]. Using
dqeH/dφ = 1/ (dpi
∗(qeH)/dq) and equation (15), ∂E(v)/∂φ|φ=φ0 is proportional to
(H − L) (dv∗(H)/dq)− (v∗(H)− v∗(L))
(dpi∗(H)/dq) (v∗(H)− v∗(L)) (H − L) +
f(φ0)
F (φ0)
.
The ﬁrst term is strictly negative since H > q∗(L), and dominates the second term provided
f(φ0)/F (φ0) is suﬃciently small.
All remaining proofs for the paper are in Section B of the Supplementary Appendix.
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Supplementary Appendix
Section A: Further Information on Conditions 1 and 2
This section provides further details on Conditions 1 and 2.
Claim 1. Condition 1 (resp. Condition 2) ensures that buyer surplus (resp. total welfare) is
strictly convex for q ∈ (q˜, qˆv) (resp. q ∈ (q˜, qˆw)), and weakly concave for q above qˆv (resp. qˆw).
Proof. Using the deﬁnitions of p∗(q) and v∗(q) in equations (1) and (4), and also the deﬁ-
nition w∗(q) = v∗(q) + pi∗(q), we have that d2v∗(q)/dq2 ∝ zv (p∗(q)− q) and d2w∗(q)/dq2 ∝
zw (p
∗(q)− q) for all q ∈ (q˜, q˜). Then note that since 1−G(ε) is logconcave, p∗(q)− q is strictlydecreasing in q, with limq→q˜p∗(q)−q = b and limq→q˜ p∗(q)−q = a. Finally note that for q˜ <∞,v∗(q) and w∗(q) are both linear (and so weakly concave) for all q > q˜.
Now consider the following generalized setting in which demand equals s
[
1−G (p−q−µ
m
)]
,
where µ is a location parameter and m, s ∈ (0,∞) are stretch parameters (Weyl and Tirole
2012). This corresponds to a setting in which a mass s > 0 of buyers have unit demand, and
each buyer's valuation is given by q+µ+mε with ε distributed according to G(ε). In the main
text we focus on the case µ = 0 and m = s = 1. However in fact:
Claim 2. If Conditions 1 and 2 hold for a demand 1−G(p−q), they also hold for any generalized
demand of the form s
[
1−G (p−q−µ
m
)]
.
Proof. Consider Condition 1. The market coverage point for this generalized demand is q˜(s,m, µ) =
µ + m (−a+ 1/g(a)), hence q˜(s,m, µ) < ∞ if and only if q˜ < ∞. Also the other threshold
q˜(s,m, µ) satisﬁes q˜(s,m, µ) = −∞ if and only if q˜ = −∞. Let σ(ψ; s,m, µ) be the curvatureof the generalized demand form. We may then write the analogue of zv(ψ) for this new demand
as
zv(ψ; s,m, µ) = −dσ(ψ; s,m, µ)
dψ
+ [2− σ(ψ; s,m, µ)]
[
dsG
(
ψ−µ
m
)
dψ
/
s
[
1−G
(
ψ − µ
m
)]]
.
After solving for σ(ψ; s,m, µ) and substituting it in, then canceling terms:
zv(ψ; s,m, µ) =
1
m
[
−σ′
(
ψ − µ
m
)
+
[
2− σ
(
ψ − µ
m
)]
g
(
ψ−µ
m
)
1−G (ψ−µ
m
)] ∝ zv (ψ − µ
m
)
.
Hence zv(ψ; s,m, µ) satisﬁes Condition 1 if and only if zv(ψ) satisﬁes it. The proof for Condition
2 is very similar and so is omitted.
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Speciﬁc Examples
We now show that Conditions 1 and 2 are satisﬁed by a wide range of common demand curves.
In light of Claim 2 it is suﬃcient to focus on the case s = m = 1 and µ = 0. For further
related background material, including a proof that demands with distributions 2-6 below have
increasing curvature, see Fabinger and Weyl (2015) and their associated online appendix.
1. Generalized Pareto Distribution: G(ψ) = 1−
(
1− (1−σ)ψ
(2−σ)
) 1
1−σ
on
[
0, 2−σ
1−σ
)
for σ < 1, and
G(ψ) = 1−e−ψ on [0,∞) for σ = 1. Special cases include the Uniform (σ = 0) and Exponential
(σ = 1) distributions. Note that q˜ = (2 − σ) < ∞ and σ(ψ) = σ. Hence Conditions 1i and 2i
are satisﬁed, because zv(ψ) = (2− σ) > 0 and zw(ψ) = (3− σ)(2− σ) > 0.
2. Normal: G(ψ) =
´ ψ
−∞
e−ψ
2/2√
2pi
dx on (−∞,∞). Note that q˜ = −∞, q˜ = ∞, and σ(ψ) =ψ[1−G(ψ)]
g(ψ)
because g′(ψ) = −ψg(ψ). Hence limψ→a σ(ψ) = −∞. Moreover
zv(ψ) ∝ 2
(
g(ψ)
1−G(ψ)
)2
− 1− ψ2. (25)
Condition 1ii is satisﬁed because (25) is negative as ψ → −∞, is strictly increasing in ψ ≤ 0
since g(ψ)
1−G(ψ) is strictly increasing, and is strictly positive for all ψ ≥ 0. To prove the latter,
note that for all ψ ≥ 0 we have the lower bound g(ψ)
1−G(ψ) ≥
ψ+
√
ψ2+8/pi
2
(see Duembgen 2010). In
addition
zw(ψ) ∝ 6
(
g(ψ)
1−G(ψ)
)2
− 4ψ g(ψ)
1−G(ψ) − 1 = 6
(
g(ψ)
1−G(ψ)
)2
+ 4
g′(ψ)
1−G(ψ) − 1. (26)
Condition 2ii is satisﬁed. Firstly as ψ → −∞, (26) tends to −1. Secondly (26) is strictly
increasing in ψ < −1, because g(ψ)
1−G(ψ) and g
′(ψ) > 0 are both strictly increasing. Thirdly (26) is
strictly positive for all ψ ∈ [−1, 0]. This can be proved by noting that on this interval, we have
the lower bound g(ψ) ≥
(
1− ψ2
2
)
/
√
2pi, and the upper bound 1−G(ψ) ≤ 1
2
− xg(0). Fourthly
(26) is also strictly positive for all ψ > 0. This can be proved by noting that g(ψ)
1−G(ψ) strictly
increasing implies 2
(
g(ψ)
1−G(ψ)
)2
> 2
(
g(0)
1−G(0)
)2
> 1, and also 4
[(
g(ψ)
1−G(ψ)
)2
+ g
′(ψ)
1−G(ψ)
]
> 0.
3. Weibull: G(ψ) = 1 − e−ψα on [0,∞) where α > 1. Note that q˜ = −∞, q˜ = ∞,
σ(ψ) = 1−
(
α−1
αψα
)
and limψ→a σ(ψ) = −∞. Moreover
zv(ψ) ∝ (α− 1)(ψα − 1) + αψ2α and zw(ψ) ∝ 2α2ψ2α + 3α(α− 1)ψα − (α− 1) (27)
Conditions 1ii and 2ii are both satisﬁed, since both expressions in (27) are strictly negative as
ψ → 0, strictly increasing in ψ and strictly positive as ψ →∞.
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4. Type I Extreme Value (Max version): G(ψ) = e−e
−ψ
on (−∞,∞). Note q˜ = −∞, q˜ =∞,
σ(ψ) = (eψ−1)(ee−ψ−1) and limψ→a σ(ψ) = −∞. Numerical simulations show that Conditions
1i and 2i are both satisﬁed.
5. Logistic: G(ψ) = e
ψ
1+eψ
on (−∞,∞). Note that q˜ = −∞, q˜ = ∞, σ(ψ) = 1 − e−ψ andlimψ→a σ(ψ) = −∞. Condition 1ii is satisﬁed because zv(ψ) ∝ e2ψ − 1, which is single-crossing
from negative to positive at ψ = 0. However Condition 2ii is not satisﬁed since zw(ψ) ∝ 2+2e−ψ,
which is strictly positive everywhere.19
6. Type I Extreme Value (Min version): G(ψ) = 1− e−eψ on (−∞,∞). Note that q˜ = −∞,q˜ = ∞, σ(ψ) = 1 − e−ψ and limψ→a σ(ψ) = −∞. Condition 1ii is satisﬁed because zv(ψ) ∝
e−ψ(1−e−ψ)−1, which is single-crossing from negative to positive at ψ = ln
(
−1+√5
2
)
. However
Condition 2ii is not satisﬁed since zw(ψ) ∝ 2 + 3e−ψ, which is strictly positive everywhere.
Section B: Remaining Proofs
Proof of Lemma 6 and Proposition 6. We prove Lemma 6 and Proposition 6 together, in
several steps.
1) Given that beliefs are price-independent, E(q|r) fully determines prices. Hence y∗ is necessary
and suﬃcient to write down expected buyer surplus, total welfare, and proﬁt (before penalties
are deducted). Lemma 6i then follows (we return to 6ii later).
2) Buyer surplus. Firstly, buyer surplus is not maximized if any report r = qi<n is sent by
more than one type. To see why, consider a new triangular matrix with y′i,i =
∑n−1
j=1 y
∗
i,j and
y′i,n = y
∗
i,n for all i < n. Strict convexity of v
∗(q) ∈ (q˜, q˜) implies that buyer surplus is strictlyhigher, by Jensen's inequality. Secondly, buyer surplus is not maximized if E(q|r = qn) > q˜
and y∗i,n < 1 for some i < n. This is because the derivative of expected buyer surplus with
respect to y∗i,n is xi [v
∗(q˜)− v∗(qi)] > 0. Thirdly, buyer surplus is not maximized if E(q|r =
qn) = q˜, and there exists some j < k such that y
∗
k,n < 1 but y
∗
j,n > 0. To see this, note that
∂y∗j,n
∂y∗k,n
∣∣∣
E(q|r=qn)=q˜
= −xk(q˜−qk)
xj(q˜−qj) . The derivative of E(v) with respect to y
∗
k,n, whilst adjusting y
∗
j,n
to ensure E(q|r = qn) = q˜, is proportional to
(q˜ − qj) [v∗(q˜)− v∗(qk)]− (q˜ − qk) [v∗(q˜)− v∗(qj)] ,
which is strictly positive since v∗(q) is strictly convex. Proposition 6i then follows.
3) Proﬁt. Since pi∗(q) is convex, and strictly so for q ∈ (q˜, q˜), a similar approach to the ﬁrst partof the previous step shows that expected proﬁt (before penalties are deducted) is maximized
by y∗i,i = 1 for all i. Hence expected proﬁt once penalties are deducted, is also maximized by
19Consequently a welfare-maximizing policymaker always optimally induces y∗ = 0. This is also true for the
next distribution.
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y∗i,i = 1 for all i, and Proposition 6ii follows.
4) Total welfare. Firstly, total welfare is not maximized if any report r = qi for i < n is
sent by more than one type, and the proof is similar to that for buyer surplus. Secondly,
if E(q|r = qn) > q˜ and there exists some i < n with y∗i,n < 1, total welfare is increasing
in y∗i,n if and only if qi ≥ L∗. To see this, the derivative of E(TW ) with respect to y∗i,n is
v∗ (q˜) + a + qi − v∗(qi) − pi∗(qi), which is positive if and only if qi exceeds a threshold (which
we call L∗). Thirdly, total welfare is not maximized if E(q|r = qn) = q˜, and there exists some
j < k such that y∗k,n < 1 but y
∗
j,n > 0. The proof closely follows the same arguments for buyer
surplus. Proposition 6iii then follows.
5) Implementation. Note that the maximum gain from false advertising is φ¯ = pi∗(qn) −
pi∗(q1). First, set φ(qi, qj) = φ¯ for all j /∈ {qi, qn} so that in any equilibrium, each ﬁrm either
reports truthfully or reports r = qn. Second, for any type i for whom y
∗
i,i = 1, also set
φ(qi, qn) = φ¯. Third, for any type i for whom y
∗
i,n = 1, set φ(qi, qn) = 0. Fourth, let q
e
n =
(
∑n
j=1 xjy
∗
j,nqj)/(
∑n
j=1 xjy
∗
j,n). For any type i for whom y
∗
i,i = 1 − y∗i,n and y∗i,n ∈ (0, 1) (there
is at most one such i) set φ(qi, qn) = pi
∗(qen) − pi∗(qi). Fifth, it is easy to see there is a unique
equilibrium outcome in which y∗ is played, and so Lemma 6ii follows.
Proof of Lemma 7. The proof closely follows that of Proposition 1.
a) As usual let qeH = E(q|r = H) and y∗ = Pr (r(L) = H). The second restriction implies that
following r = H the ﬁrm charges p∗(qeH ;H). Bayes' rule implies that following r = H and
p = p∗(qeH ;H) the ﬁrm is believed to have high quality with probability (1− x)/(1− x+ xy∗).
b) Suppose r = L is on-path. Firstly if a ﬁrm reports r = L its price must maximize proﬁt given
buyer beliefs. Secondly buyer beliefs must satisfy Bayes' rule following r = L and any on-path
price(s). Hence given the ﬁrst restriction, a ﬁrm that reports r = L must charge p∗(L;L), and
be believed to have low quality with probability 1.
c) Necessary conditions for optimality of the low type's behavior: Firstly given y∗ = 0, reporting
r = L is weakly dominant only if φ ≥ φ′0. Secondly given y∗ = 1, reporting r = H is weakly
dominant only if φ ≤ φ′1. Thirdly given y∗ ∈ (0, 1), the low type is indiﬀerent between r = L
and r = H iﬀ (16) holds. Note that for c(H)− c(L) small, φ′1 < φ′0, and that (16) has a unique
solution y∗ ∈ (0, 1) if and only if φ ∈ (φ′1, φ′0).
d) The conditions given in the previous step are also suﬃcient for optimality of the low type's
behavior, given appropriate oﬀ-path beliefs such as those in the lemma.
e) Clearly the high type strictly prefers to report r = H and charge p∗(qeH ;H) for appropriate
oﬀ-path beliefs, such as those in the lemma.
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Proof of Lemma 8. We can simply repeat all the steps used in the proof of Proposition 1.
The only diﬀerence is that in the second step, each ﬁrm's price maximizes its proﬁts given buyer
beliefs and its conjecture about the other ﬁrm's price. Hence following a report r = i for i ∈
{L,H}, the ﬁrms play Nash equilibrium prices p∗I(qI , E(qE|r = i)) and p∗E(E(qE|r = i), qI).
Proof of Proposition 7. Under full information:
v∗(qI , qE) =
−
5t
4
+ qI+qE
2
+ (qE−qI)
2
36t
if qE ∈
(
qE˜, q˜E
)
qI +
t
2
if qE ≥ q˜E
Expected buyer surplus is E(v) = x(1 − y∗)v∗(qI , L) + (1 − x + xy∗)v∗(qI , qeH). Given L ≥ qE˜,v∗(qI , qE) has the same shape as v∗(q) in the monopoly problem under Condition 1i with qˆv = q˜E.
Hence the proposition is proved in a similar way to Proposition 2, just with q˜E replacing q
∗(L)
and qˆv.
Proof of Proposition 8. Under full information, w∗(qI , qE) = v∗(qI , qE)+pi∗I (qI , qE)+pi
∗
E(qI , qE)
equals:
w∗(qI , qE) =
−
t
4
+ qI+qE
2
+ 5(qE−qI)
2
36t
if qE ∈
(
qE˜, q˜E
)
qE − t2 if qE ≥ q˜E
Expected total welfare isE(w) = x(1− y∗)w∗(qI , L) + (1− x+ xy∗)w∗(qI , qeH). When L ∈ [qE˜, q˜E)direct computation reveals that a) ∂E(w)/∂y∗ < 0 when qeH ≤ q˜E, and b) for qeH > q˜E,
∂E(w)/∂y∗ < 0 if and only if L < L∗E = qI + 3t/5. Hence the claim can be proved using a
similar approach as in Proposition 4.
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